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The state as perpetrator
Looking at issues of  security and democracy from the 
perspectives of  those most affected by violence can unsettle 
many common assumptions, primary among them that states 
have a monopoly on the use of  violence and that they exer-
cise the security function in the best interests of  all citizens. 
Recent research and publications by the Development Re-
search Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountabil-
ity highlight how in many contexts the state’s security forces 
are seen to protect the interests of  the state itself, of  local or 
transnational private capital, or of  particular groups – acting 
in favour of  some sectors by wielding violence against others.
• In Nigeria, citizens report that both the Federation and 
southern states often prioritise protection of  the transnational 
oil industry in the Delta region above the protection of  civil-
ians and their basic welfare needs. The state’s “zero-tolerance” 
of  vigilantism in the region, whilst seen by many as valid, can 
weaken voice and agency and exacerbate sectarian tensions.
• In Bangladesh, in some instances alliances are formed 
between state actors and local urban developers to harass and 
dislodge slum-dwellers.
• In Jamaica, citizens say that the police rarely investigate 
or address crime, and sometimes act as “gangstas” or hired 
guns for those with grudges against their neighbours.
The absent state
In contexts where of cial state security provision is weak or 
inadequate, the security function is effectively delegated to 
non-state actors. These often deploy a mix of  violence and 
protection to perpetuate their political, social and economic 
control, with varying degrees of  active complicity or passive 
tolerance from the state.
• In Medellín, Colombia, paramilitary groups, of cially 
demobilised while in negotiations with the state, continue 
to control many poor areas of  the city, offering protection 
against the very violence they help to generate.
• In Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, militias are formed of  former sol-
diers, police of cers, prison guards and  remen. Using police 
equipment, these militias have invaded and taken control of  
several favelas, expelling those associated with drug traf cking.
Broadening Spaces for Citizens in Violent Contexts
Violence and everyday insecurity are amongst the root causes of  poverty: a simple and true statement that has at last been 
acknowledged in several international agreements, including the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence (2008) and Dili Dec-
laration (2010). Several new funding mechanisms have even been established to support efforts to reduce violence, including 
those that address the special security needs of  excluded groups, women, youth and children. What recent policies have failed 
to adequately consider, however, is that poor and dispossessed people often perceive the state as a perpetrator or accomplice - 
whether by active complicity or passive omission – in the violence visited upon them. For policymakers and practitioners eager 
to move beyond top-down approaches to reducing insecurity and violence, this policy brie ng offers insights into how local 
residents can be directly involved in  nding solutions for their security and livelihood needs. Research from a range of  contexts 
characterised by violence and everyday insecurity suggests that external actors can help to broaden spaces where citizens can 
take action in non-violent, socially legitimate ways, but that success depends on gaining a locally nuanced understanding of  the 
complex relationship between violent and non-violent actors, and between forms of  everyday violence and political violence.
Children ride their bikes in the the Santa Marta favela, an informal settlement 
in Rio de Janeiro. Between 1993 and 2002, 16,426 people were ‘disappeared’ 
in Rio de Janeiro in the battle between drug traf cking groups, police and 
para-state militias. (Photo © Ivanildo Carmo dos Santos/Agencia Olhares)
This policy briefing draws from „Violence, Social Action and Research.‰ IDS Bulletin, Vol. 40 (3). See the back page for citiations 
and other resources. This document is an output from a project funded by UK aid from the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID. 
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The political consequences of 
everyday violence
The fear and mistrust that result from violence shape people’s 
perception of  their political community, with direct conse-
quences for the quality of  democratic governance. 
Silencing: Violence can be extremely disempowering. In 
many cases, victims of  violence are unwilling or unable to 
speak out, failing even to recognise the violence to which 
they have been subjected. Research with victims of  gender-
based violence in El Salvador, indigenous communities 
suffering structural violence in Mexico and Peruvian school 
teachers who invoke pishtacos (evil spirits) as metaphors for 
the dangers of  their world, all suggest that insecure and ex-
cluded people perceive security in very different ways from 
the dominant narratives and from each other.
Segregating: Violence is frequently legitimated through a pro-
cess of  ‘othering’ whereby a speci c group is separated from 
others, dehumanized, labeled as dangerous, not belonging or 
unimportant - such as through the use of  ethnic and religious 
stereotypes to justify violence in Nigeria, or the reinforcement 
of  inequalities between the secure rich and insecure poor in 
Rio de Janeiro through private security provision. 
Subduing: Violence deters citizen action in more direct 
ways as well. The physical appropriation of  space by non-
state security actors can prevent citizens from assembling 
and mobilising. In Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, militias have 
occupied residents’ association buildings and control 
space via patrols, cameras, barriers and wall murals. The 
use or threatened use of  force during electoral processes 
constitutes a direct disruption of  procedural democracy. 
Organised armed actors also use their monopoly on or 
dominance over the means of  violence to establish 
themselves as quasi-legitimate mediators. In these con-
texts, non-violent civil society groups may exist, although 
go largely unrecognised. 
Besides political consequences, state violence and tolerance of  
violence have intimate personal consequences: they tend to 
feed other forms of  violence between citizens, including in the 
home, schools and the neighbourhood.
Citizen coping strategies in the 
absence of security
In the absence of  an effective response from the state to 
the everyday violence and insecurity they suffer, citizens 
may adopt a range of  strategies to cope with, respond to or 
resist the violence and those who perpetrate it. These cop-
ing strategies and alternative structures are not necessarily 
benign. They can have both positive and negative conse-
quences for citizens, their democratic participation and 
levels of  violence in their communities. As such they are a 
critical link between forms of  everyday violence and politi-
cal violence. The Citizenship DRC’s research reveals three 
main strategies employed by citizens in violent contexts.
(i) Withdrawal into partial citizenship or self-censorship: In 
the face of  physical and symbolic appropriation of  space by 
violent actors, citizens in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas in Brazil 
withdraw from public spaces and public facilities, leaving 
them to the militia and drug gangs.
(ii) Peaceful coexistence with violent actors: In Jamaica 
citizens evoke protective services of  ‘community gangs’ 
against the real ‘criminal gangs’; in one case in Colombia, 
citizens bolstered the authority of  violent actors by 
‘keeping them sweet’. 
(iii) Establishing parallel governance or security structures: 
In Bangladesh, NGOs work to prevent and redress gender-
based violence using the parallel community arbitration 
mechanism known as Shalish; in the Niger Delta, citizens 
have established their own vigilante groups to protect their 
interests against predatory foreign capital.
LOCAL STRATEGIES ARE NEEDED TO COMPLEMENT, NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR, NATIONAL LEVEL PROGRAMMES
Since 2004 in Nigeria, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has provided support for the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission to promote justice as a solution to the root causes of violence. Yet, the tragic 
eruptions of violence in Jos since November 2008 (and a recent Strategic Conflict Assessment by the UK Government) 
demonstrate that the underlying causes of violence have not been adequately addressed.
In Jamaica, DFID has been active in modernising the Jamaican Constabulary Force, whilst supporting a £1 million 
programme to restore services such as security provision, refuse collection, water and sanitation, power and health 
clinics to six neighbourhoods where organised criminals and gang leaders have been removed. Research by the 
Citizenship DRC suggests that such programmes provide a moment of opportunity to get citizens engaged. 
In both cases, unless trust between authorities and communities (and within communities) is restored through dialogue, 
sustainable progress is unlikely.
The recognition that the state often fails to provide adequate security for its citizens or undermines democratic 
governance through actions committed in the name of security calls into question top-down approaches to reducing 
insecurity and violence
 3
BUILDING ON LOCAL INITIATIVES AND CITIZEN ACTION
If they receive appropriate support, existing, but often unrecognised, associations can provide a building-block for 
citizen engagement with a newly democratising state.
! In Angola, civil society appeared to have been decimated by 25 years of conflict, war and authoritarian rule. Yet, 
Citizenship DRC research has shown that local civil society associations emerged in the displacement camps amidst 
the conflict and continue to work for better services and treatment for poor and displaced people.
! In Bangladesh, large-scale NGOs have taken over many functions of the state. Research by the Citizenship 
DRC suggests that some of these NGOs, beyond delivering services, also contribute to the formation of a sense 
of citizenship for their members. This sense of citizenship is an important stepping-stone to fostering stronger 
relationships between citizens and the state and increasing the capacity of the state in Bangladesh to act.
! In Mexico, groups of indigenous people met to discuss how different kinds of violence affect their communities and 
shared their reflections with organisations focusing on health, justice, and education. Recognising the role of violence in 
limiting access to each of these areas has been an important step toward considering how the state can better relate 
to marginalised and extremely poor rural indigenous villages.
Integrating citizensÊ perspectives into 
violence reduction strategies
Given the complexity of  state and non-state actors, overlap-
ping structures of  power and authority, and multiple forms of  
everyday violence that characterise many insecure communi-
ties, it is essential that external interventions are grounded in a 
thorough understanding of  the local context. Otherwise, there 
are real risks that interventions might exacerbate local tensions, 
inadvertently support violent actors and heighten insecurity.
It is the citizens living in these communities who possess 
vital knowledge about local power dynamics, existing coping 
strategies, sources of  resilience, spaces and organisational 
structures that might be built upon to design appropriate 
community security or violence reduction strategies. Local 
citizens are also able to help analyse how various interven-
tions might affect different local actors and how these 
dynamics and impacts might best be managed. 
In the interest of  carrying out research that was not only 
ethical but that might in itself  contribute to positive change, 
researchers from the Citizenship DRC documented lessons 
that would be useful for any external actor who wishes to 
understand the realities of  violence:
• Sensitive, respectful consultation with communities that 
enhances trust and avoids causing them harm; 
• Working with non-violent community leaders and 
community-based organisations using participatory action 
research to analyse and raise awareness of  local power dy-
namics, sources of  insecurity and forms of  resilience; and
• Using pre-existing community initiatives as less risky ‘entry 
points’ for addressing broader issues of  violence and insecurity.
Using participatory and action research 
in violent contexts
Participatory and action research methods are one way of  
providing a space for citizenship. By employing techniques 
such as participatory video and public theatre, researchers 
can promote dialogue and cooperation in communities, 
which can help to address the causes of  violence. At the 
same time, such techniques carry risks. Public mediums like 
theatre and video can exacerbate the already dif cult task of  
holding discussions on sensitive topics, and should be used 
with caution in violent contexts.
• In northern Nigeria, researchers working with the Theatre 
for Development Centre found that participatory learning 
and action (including theatre, song and dance) had positive 
impacts. Community-designed performances created the space 
for citizens to transcend traditional hierarchies and voice their 
concerns and complaints, without fear of  sanctions from the 
local elite. Following this, communities were able to catalogue 
their collective concerns before meeting with local authorities. 
• In Brazil, researchers put video cameras in the hands of  
favela residents living with everyday violence and worked 
with them to produce a documentary  lm. The resulting 
 lm and multi-media CD-ROM addressed popular myths 
about favela residents and have since been used to promote 
dialogue with community leaders, government of cials, 
politicians and the media on security issues in Rio de Janeiro.
In these ways, donors can support mechanisms for local 
groups to develop and articulate an agenda for negotiating 
with formal state institutions.
National level strategies to address violence need to be complemented by community-level initiatives that are mindful 
of existing strategies adopted by citizens to cope with, respond to or resist violence.
 4
Implications for policy and practice
• Recognise that state actors can be a source of  security 
and insecurity: State actors may protect some sectors, tolerate 
or perpetrate violence against others, or simply abdicate respon-
sibility to protect some groups of  citizens. It is imperative that 
policy makers design speci c strategies for coping with state-
sponsored violence, and to address the consequences of  state 
failure to provide security. Currently policies fail to safeguard 
programmes and communities against state-sponsored violence.
• Recognise the threat of  violence in “non-fragile” con-
texts: International donors have increasingly worked to address 
violence in “fragile” or “con ict-affected” states. Yet violence 
- or the threat of  it - is an everyday reality for many people 
across the world, including in states considered fairly “effec-
tive” in delivering rights and resources to their citizens. Policy 
makers can usefully build on the recent work of  the OECD-
DAC and Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence Reduction 
to support interventions in ‘non-fragile’, democratising or 
democratic states that suffer from pockets of  violence.
• Work at both state and community level: State-led initia-
tives to strengthen judicial systems and security forces are 
important, but in order to build effective state-society interac-
tions, attention must be also be paid to supporting the capac-
ity of  non-violent civil society organisations in these contexts. 
It can be particularly effective to work with individuals and 
organisations already well-placed to effect positive change, 
but caution must be exercised in understanding the positions 
and interests of  different actors.
• Conduct detailed analysis of  local power dynamics, 
actors and relationships: It is essential to fully understand 
the often complex medley of  state and non-state actors, their 
role in security provision and perpetration of  violence, and 
the linkages between them. Participatory and action research 
methods can be effective to elicit citizens’ local knowledge, 
raise awareness and build ownership and sustainability of  
initiatives to reduce violence.
• Develop intervention strategies based on the local 
context: There is no ‘one size  ts all’ model for community 
security or violence reduction programmes. Universalist or 
overly state-centric initiatives can often do more harm than 
good at a local level.
• Recognise that citizens’ responses to violence are not 
necessarily benign: The strategies citizens adopt can have posi-
tive or negative consequences for democratic participation and 
levels of  violence. Parallel non-state structures can act as building 
blocks towards state accountability, yet, they can also reproduce 
the selectivity, violence and anti-democratic tendencies of  state 
provision, as well as undermine the state’s legitimacy.
• Build on existing sources of  resilience, ‘safe spaces’ 
and structures for change: In many cases, it may be better 
to  nd an entry point unrelated to violence, then build 
awareness and broaden to issues of  violence and insecurity.
Actors performing in public in Kano, Nigeria in 2005. Public drama is one 
method of  opening space for dialogue in violent settings. 
Over the past ten years, researchers from the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and 
Accountability have documented nearly 150 cases of how citizen-led initiatives can serve to build state institutions by 
conferring legitimacy, demanding accountability, influencing responsive policies, countering elite capture of resources and 
implementing effective services. More recently, the researchers have turned this perspective on a variety of contexts where 
endemic violence reduces peopleÊs willingness to engage in the public sphere. The full text of this Policy Briefing and more 
information about the Citizenship DRC and its work are available on its website: www.drc-citizenship.org.
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